a8f6e537853ec00e23e810ce6c4f680bb65d9582
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3b2dd365ad |
feat(pgserver): Phase 6 — TLS + source-IP allowlist
Closes the v1.0 hardening surface: encrypted transport + a
coarse pg_hba.conf-equivalent CIDR allowlist. Together with the
Phase 5 auth flows, this is the security-baseline an internet-
exposed PostgreSQL-wire server needs.
TLS subsystem
-------------
`hbrtl/pgserver/tls.go`:
* `LoadTLSFromFiles(certPath, keyPath)` — cert/key PEM pair load
with tls.VersionTLS12 floor. Installed as the *pending* config
that the next PG_SERVER_START consumes (matches PG's
"must-set-before-pg_ctl-start" semantics).
* `GenerateSelfSignedCert(certPath, keyPath, hostname)` — ECDSA
P-256 + 365-day validity + DNSNames+IPAddresses SANs covering
the hostname plus 127.0.0.1 / ::1. Dev/CI helper; production
ships a CA-signed cert via the loader.
* `upgradeToTLS()` wraps `tls.Server(conn, cfg).Handshake()` so
pgproto3 reads plaintext on top of the encrypted stream.
Source-IP allowlist
-------------------
* `AllowIP(cidr)` parses a CIDR and appends it to a per-server
list snapshotted at PG_SERVER_START time.
* `peerAllowed(remote, list)` runs at accept() — empty list →
accept any, otherwise drop connections whose RemoteAddr falls
outside every registered range.
* `ClearAllowList()` resets to allow-all.
Coarse but compatible with the "host alice 10.0.0.0/8 md5"-style
entries every pg_hba.conf author already knows; a fuller per-
role/per-database matcher is Phase 6.1+.
PRG bindings (register.go)
--------------------------
New HB_FUNCs, all idempotent and composable in any order before
PG_SERVER_START:
pg_tls_load( certPath, keyPath ) → .T. | cErr
pg_tls_self_signed( cert, key, hostname ) → .T. | cErr
pg_allow_ip( cidr ) → .T. | cErr
pg_clear_allowlist() → NIL
Bootstrap idiom:
PROCEDURE Main()
PG_TLS_SELF_SIGNED( "/tmp/cert.pem", "/tmp/key.pem", "localhost" )
PG_ADD_ROLE( "alice", "swordfish" )
PG_ALLOW_IP( "127.0.0.1/32" )
PG_ALLOW_IP( "10.0.0.0/8" )
PG_SERVER_START( ":5432", "md5" )
The startup banner now reports TLS + allowlist state so the PRG
operator sees the security posture at a glance:
pgserver: listening on :5432 (auth=md5 tls=on allowlist=2)
Verification
------------
End-to-end via real psql against a self-signed server:
$ PGPASSWORD=swordfish psql \
"postgres://alice@127.0.0.1:15432/alice?sslmode=require" \
-c "SELECT 'tls-works' AS x" -At
tls-works
$ # off-allowlist source (192.168.x.x mock) → connection refused
$ # (verified manually; psql can't easily spoof src IP for CI)
Integration script gates expanded to 6/6:
PASS Simple Query
PASS Multi-statement Simple Query
PASS Transaction control
PASS MD5 auth: wrong password rejected
PASS MD5 auth: correct password accepted
PASS TLS handshake + MD5 auth via sslmode=require
All six release gates green:
go test ./... ✓
FiveSql2 SQL:1999 43/43 ✓
Harbour compat 56/56 ✓
std.ch 17/17 ✓
FRB 7/7 ✓
pgserver integration 6/6 ✓
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
|||
| d98f5e1767 |
feat(pgserver): PostgreSQL-wire MVP — psql can SELECT from FiveSql2
First end-to-end working version of the PostgreSQL-wire-compatible
TCP server frontend. A standard `psql` client now connects, runs
`SELECT * FROM employees`, and gets back a properly typed result
set rendered by psql with the right column alignment:
ID | NAME | SALARY
----+----------------------+----------
1 | Alice | 50000.00
2 | Bob | 42000.50
3 | Cho | 77500.00
This is the Phase 2 deliverable from the approved plan at
/Users/charleskwon/.claude/plans/compiled-launching-shore.md.
Builds on the session-state refactor in
|
