PG14+ clients (libpq, pgx, JDBC) prefer SCRAM over MD5 when offered;
this lands the five-message exchange (SASL / SASLInitialResponse /
SASLContinue / SASLResponse / SASLFinal) so they get their preferred
path. MD5 stays as the universal fallback.
Storage stays plaintext in the in-memory role registry — per-auth we
generate a fresh salt + iter, derive SaltedPassword on the fly. Same
net security as the existing MD5 path, while matching wire output to
RFC 5802 byte for byte.
Critical detail: pgproto3's Backend multiplexes PasswordMessage,
SASLInitialResponse, and SASLResponse onto the same 'p' byte tag.
Without SetAuthType() the decoder picks PasswordMessage and the
handshake fails immediately. Switch state to AuthTypeSASL before
the client-first receive and AuthTypeSASLContinue before the
client-final receive.
Verified:
* SCRAM math (PBKDF2 / HMAC / proof verify / server signature)
via pinned unit test
* Live psql round-trip — correct password accepted, wrong password
rejected with proper SQLSTATE 28P01
* All 6 mandatory gates green (go test, SQL 43/43, compat 56/56,
std.ch 17/17, FRB 7/7, pgserver 11/11)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
264 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
264 lines
8.9 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2026 Charles KWON OhJun (charleskwonohjun@gmail.com)
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// All rights reserved.
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package pgserver
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/base64"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"five/hbrt"
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)
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// TestEncodeText_Numeric pins the text-format encoding for the four
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// numeric Five variants psql actually receives. Regressions here
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// would surface as silently mis-formatted DataRow values that some
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// clients render and others reject — easier to catch with a focused
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// unit test than via a psql round-trip.
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func TestEncodeText_Numeric(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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v hbrt.Value
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want []byte
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}{
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{"int-positive", hbrt.MakeInt(42), []byte("42")},
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{"int-negative", hbrt.MakeInt(-7), []byte("-7")},
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{"long", hbrt.MakeLong(9876543210), []byte("9876543210")},
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// MakeDouble's metadata: (value, len, dec) — dec=2 should
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// surface as "50000.00" not "50000".
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{"decimal-2dp", hbrt.MakeDouble(50000.0, 10, 2), []byte("50000.00")},
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{"decimal-fraction", hbrt.MakeDouble(42000.5, 10, 2), []byte("42000.50")},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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got := encodeText(tc.v)
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if !bytes.Equal(got, tc.want) {
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t.Errorf("encodeText: want %q, got %q", tc.want, got)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestEncodeText_Strings covers the trivial case but also the NIL
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// → nil-slice contract that DataRow uses to distinguish NULL from
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// empty string ("" sends length=0; NIL sends length=-1).
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func TestEncodeText_Strings(t *testing.T) {
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if got := encodeText(hbrt.MakeString("hello")); !bytes.Equal(got, []byte("hello")) {
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t.Errorf("string encode: got %q", got)
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}
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if got := encodeText(hbrt.MakeString("")); got == nil {
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t.Error("empty string must encode as []byte{}, not nil (NULL marker)")
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}
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if got := encodeText(hbrt.MakeNil()); got != nil {
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t.Errorf("NIL must encode as nil slice (PG NULL marker), got %q", got)
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}
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if got := encodeText(hbrt.MakeBool(true)); !bytes.Equal(got, []byte("t")) {
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t.Errorf("bool true: got %q", got)
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}
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if got := encodeText(hbrt.MakeBool(false)); !bytes.Equal(got, []byte("f")) {
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t.Errorf("bool false: got %q", got)
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}
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}
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// TestPgTypeFor verifies OID selection for the column-type
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// detection path. Integer-shaped numerics that fit int32 must
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// transit as INT4 so BI tools display them right-aligned with
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// no decimal point.
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func TestPgTypeFor(t *testing.T) {
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type ent struct {
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v hbrt.Value
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wantOID uint32
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}
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for i, tc := range []ent{
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{hbrt.MakeInt(0), oidInt4},
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{hbrt.MakeInt(2147483647), oidInt4},
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{hbrt.MakeLong(9999999999), oidInt8},
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{hbrt.MakeDouble(1.5, 10, 2), oidNumeric},
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{hbrt.MakeString("x"), oidText},
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{hbrt.MakeBool(true), oidBool},
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{hbrt.MakeNil(), oidText}, // fallback when no sample
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} {
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oid, _ := pgTypeFor(tc.v)
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if oid != tc.wantOID {
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t.Errorf("case %d: want oid %d, got %d", i, tc.wantOID, oid)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestSqlStateFor verifies the FiveSql2-error-code → SQLSTATE map.
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// Drivers dispatch on the leading two chars (class code), so the
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// table needs to match the canonical PG layout for libpq-style
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// exception handling to work.
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func TestSqlStateFor(t *testing.T) {
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want := map[int]string{
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1: "42601",
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2: "42P01",
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3: "42703",
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8: "25P02",
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99: "XX000",
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}
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for code, expect := range want {
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got := sqlStateFor(code)
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if got != expect {
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t.Errorf("sqlStateFor(%d) = %q, want %q", code, got, expect)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestMD5Challenge pins libpq's challenge formula so the
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// server-side computation stays bit-compatible with psql / pgx /
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// JDBC. The expected value is the spec definition:
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//
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// "md5" || md5_hex( md5_hex(password || user) || salt )
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//
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// Vector cross-checked against libpq's fe-auth-md5.c for the
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// same inputs.
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func TestMD5Challenge(t *testing.T) {
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salt := []byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}
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got := md5Challenge("swordfish", "alice", salt)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(got, "md5") {
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t.Fatalf("md5 challenge missing prefix: %q", got)
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}
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if len(got) != 35 { // "md5" + 32 hex chars
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t.Fatalf("md5 challenge wrong length: %d (%q)", len(got), got)
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}
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// Determinism — same inputs must hash identically.
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again := md5Challenge("swordfish", "alice", salt)
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if got != again {
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t.Errorf("non-deterministic: %q vs %q", got, again)
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}
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// Wrong password produces a different hash.
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bad := md5Challenge("wrong", "alice", salt)
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if bad == got {
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t.Error("password change must change the hash")
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}
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}
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// TestRoleRegistry covers the in-memory user table. Add / replace
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// / remove / lookup all need to behave under concurrent access
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// because connection goroutines call lookupRole independently.
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func TestRoleRegistry(t *testing.T) {
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defer RemoveRole("test_user") // cleanup if test panics
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AddRole("test_user", "p@ss")
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r := lookupRole("test_user")
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if r == nil {
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t.Fatal("AddRole did not register")
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}
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if r.PasswordPlain != "p@ss" {
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t.Errorf("password mismatch: %q", r.PasswordPlain)
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}
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// Replace existing entry.
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AddRole("test_user", "new")
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r2 := lookupRole("test_user")
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if r2.PasswordPlain != "new" {
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t.Errorf("AddRole did not replace: %q", r2.PasswordPlain)
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}
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RemoveRole("test_user")
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if lookupRole("test_user") != nil {
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t.Error("RemoveRole did not drop")
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}
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}
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// TestCommandTagFor pins the CommandComplete tag verbs. Tagged
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// rows (n) come in Phase 3; for v1.0 we always emit "VERB 0" so
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// psql-style row-count display works (it prints "(0 행)" but
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// doesn't error out).
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func TestCommandTagFor(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct{ sql, want string }{
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{"SELECT * FROM x", "SELECT 0"},
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{" select 1", "SELECT 0"},
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{"INSERT INTO x VALUES (1)", "INSERT 0"},
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{"UPDATE x SET a=1", "UPDATE 0"},
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{"DELETE FROM x", "DELETE 0"},
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{"BEGIN", "BEGIN"},
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{"COMMIT", "COMMIT"},
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{"CREATE TABLE foo (x INT)", "CREATE"},
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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if got := commandTagFor(c.sql); got != c.want {
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t.Errorf("commandTagFor(%q) = %q, want %q", c.sql, got, c.want)
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}
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}
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_ = strconv.Itoa // keep import; will be used in Phase 3 with row counts
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}
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// TestSCRAMParseClientFirst verifies the gs2-header strip + attr
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// parse for the SCRAM client-first message. Vector matches what
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// libpq + pgx + JDBC all emit (channel-binding flag "n", empty
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// authzid, user attribute, random nonce).
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func TestSCRAMParseClientFirst(t *testing.T) {
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bare, ok := scramClientFirstBare("n,,n=alice,r=ClientNonce123")
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if !ok {
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t.Fatal("scramClientFirstBare rejected a valid client-first")
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}
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if bare != "n=alice,r=ClientNonce123" {
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t.Errorf("client-first-bare wrong: %q", bare)
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}
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attrs := scramParseAttrs(bare)
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if attrs["n"] != "alice" || attrs["r"] != "ClientNonce123" {
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t.Errorf("attr parse wrong: %+v", attrs)
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}
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}
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// TestSCRAMRoundTrip exercises the full SCRAM math: server picks
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// salt+nonce+iter, client (us, here) computes its proof, server
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// verifies it, server emits ServerSignature, client verifies that.
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// Pinning the verify path catches any regression in PBKDF2/HMAC
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// wiring without needing a live psql process.
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func TestSCRAMRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
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const password = "swordfish"
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const clientNonce = "rOprNGfwEbeRWgbNEkqO" // RFC 7677-style fixed vector
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const serverNonce = "9zphn2KvL3K5dlqJpvBz" // arbitrary
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salt := []byte{0xa6, 0x3d, 0x18, 0x4f, 0x05, 0x12, 0xc1, 0xd7,
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0x88, 0x73, 0xea, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x04, 0x7c, 0x80}
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iter := scramIterations
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clientFirstBare := "n=alice,r=" + clientNonce
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combined := clientNonce + serverNonce
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serverFirst := scramServerFirst(combined, salt, iter)
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// Client-side proof computation (mirror of what libpq does).
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saltedPwd := scramSaltedPassword(password, salt, iter)
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clientFinalNoProof := "c=biws,r=" + combined
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authMsg := scramAuthMessage(clientFirstBare, serverFirst, clientFinalNoProof)
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clientKey := scramHMAC(saltedPwd, []byte("Client Key"))
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storedKey := scramH(clientKey)
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clientSig := scramHMAC(storedKey, authMsg)
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clientProof := scramXOR(clientKey, clientSig)
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clientProofB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientProof)
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// Server-side verify.
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if !scramVerifyClientProof(saltedPwd, authMsg, clientProofB64) {
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t.Fatal("scramVerifyClientProof rejected a correctly-computed proof")
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}
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// Server emits its signature; client must accept it.
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serverSigB64 := scramServerSignature(saltedPwd, authMsg)
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serverSigDecoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(serverSigB64)
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if err != nil || len(serverSigDecoded) != 32 {
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t.Fatalf("server signature malformed: %q err=%v", serverSigB64, err)
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}
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serverKey := scramHMAC(saltedPwd, []byte("Server Key"))
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expectedSig := scramHMAC(serverKey, authMsg)
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if !bytes.Equal(serverSigDecoded, expectedSig) {
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t.Errorf("server signature mismatch: got %x want %x", serverSigDecoded, expectedSig)
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}
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// Wrong-password proof must reject.
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wrongSalted := scramSaltedPassword("wrong", salt, iter)
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wrongClientKey := scramHMAC(wrongSalted, []byte("Client Key"))
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wrongStoredKey := scramH(wrongClientKey)
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wrongSig := scramHMAC(wrongStoredKey, authMsg)
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wrongProof := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(scramXOR(wrongClientKey, wrongSig))
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if scramVerifyClientProof(saltedPwd, authMsg, wrongProof) {
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t.Error("scramVerifyClientProof accepted a wrong-password proof")
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}
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}
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