* *
* partial sync with the 3.4 fork codebase. These are the things
synces for the most part:
- copyright headers
- grammar/typos in comments and some readmes
- comment/whitespace/decorations
- variable scoping in C files
- DO CASE/SWITCH and some other alternate syntax usage
- minimal amount of human readable text in strings
- minor code updates
- HB_TRACE() void * casts for pointers and few other changes to
avoid C compiler warnings
- various other, minor code cleanups
- only Harbour/C code/headers were touched in src, utils, contrib,
include. No 3rd party code, no make files, and with just a few
exceptions, no 'tests' code was touched.
- certain components were not touched were 3.4 diverged too much
already, like f.e. hbmk2, hbssl, hbcurl, hbexpat
- the goal was that no actual program logic should be altered by
these changes. Except some possible minor exceptions, any such
change is probably a bug in this patch.
It's a massive patch, if you find anything broken after it, please
open an Issue with the details. Build test was done on macOS.
The goal is make it easier to see what actual code/logic was changed
in 3.4 compared to 3.2 and to make patches easier to apply in both
ways.
195 lines
6.4 KiB
C
195 lines
6.4 KiB
C
/*
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* WARNING: Outdated, insecure algorithm.
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*
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* Version 1.0.0
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*
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* Written by Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
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*
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* Copyright 1998, 2000 Aaron D. Gifford. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/*
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* The HMAC-SHA1 has is defined as:
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*
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* HMAC = SHA1(K XOR opad, SHA1(K XOR ipad, message))
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*
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* "opad" is 64 bytes filled with 0x5c
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* "ipad" is 64 bytes filled with 0x36
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* "K" is the key material
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*
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* If the key material "K" is longer than 64 bytes, then the key material
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* will first be digested (K = SHA1(K)) resulting in a 20-byte hash.
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* If the key material is shorter than 64 bytes, it is padded with zero
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* bytes.
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*
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* This code precomputes "K XOR ipad" and "K XOR opad" since that just makes
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* sense.
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*
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* This code was heavily influenced by Eric A. Young's in how the interface
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* was designed and how this file is formatted.
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*/
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#ifndef __HMAC_SHA1_H__
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#define __HMAC_SHA1_H__
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#include "sha1hmac.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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/* Filler bytes: */
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#define IPAD_BYTE 0x36
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#define OPAD_BYTE 0x5c
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#define ZERO_BYTE 0x00
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void hb_HMAC_SHA1_Init(HMAC_SHA1_CTX *ctx) {
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memset(&(ctx->key[0]), ZERO_BYTE, HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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memset(&(ctx->ipad[0]), IPAD_BYTE, HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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memset(&(ctx->opad[0]), OPAD_BYTE, HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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ctx->keylen = 0;
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ctx->hashkey = 0;
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}
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void hb_HMAC_SHA1_UpdateKey(HMAC_SHA1_CTX *ctx, const void *key, unsigned int keylen) {
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/* Do we have anything to work with? If not, return right away. */
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if (keylen < 1)
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return;
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/*
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* Is the total key length (current data and any previous data)
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* longer than the hash block length?
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*/
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if (ctx->hashkey !=0 || (keylen + ctx->keylen) > HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
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/*
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* Looks like the key data exceeds the hash block length,
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* so that means we use a hash of the key as the key data
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* instead.
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*/
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if (ctx->hashkey == 0) {
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/*
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* Ah, we haven't started hashing the key
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* data yet, so we must init. the hash
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* monster to begin feeding it.
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*/
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/* Set the hash key flag to true (non-zero) */
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ctx->hashkey = 1;
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/* Init. the hash beastie... */
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hb_SHA1_Init(&ctx->shactx);
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/* If there's any previous key data, use it */
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if (ctx->keylen > 0) {
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hb_SHA1_Update(&ctx->shactx, &(ctx->key[0]), ctx->keylen);
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}
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/*
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* Reset the key length to the future true
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* key length, HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH
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*/
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ctx->keylen = HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH;
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}
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/* Now feed the latest key data to the has monster */
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hb_SHA1_Update(&ctx->shactx, key, keylen);
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} else {
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/*
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* Key data length hasn't yet exceeded the hash
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* block length (HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH), so theres
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* no need to hash the key data (yet). Copy it
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* into the key buffer.
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*/
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memcpy(&(ctx->key[ctx->keylen]), key, keylen);
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ctx->keylen += keylen;
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}
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}
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void hb_HMAC_SHA1_EndKey(HMAC_SHA1_CTX *ctx) {
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unsigned char *ipad, *opad, *key;
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unsigned int i;
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/* Did we end up hashing the key? */
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if (ctx->hashkey) {
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memset(&(ctx->key[0]), ZERO_BYTE, HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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/* Yes, so finish up and copy the key data */
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hb_SHA1_Final(&(ctx->key[0]), &ctx->shactx);
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/* ctx->keylen was already set correctly */
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}
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/* Pad the key if necessary with zero bytes */
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if ((i = HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH - ctx->keylen) > 0) {
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memset(&(ctx->key[ctx->keylen]), ZERO_BYTE, i);
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}
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ipad = &(ctx->ipad[0]);
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opad = &(ctx->opad[0]);
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/* Precompute the respective pads XORed with the key */
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key = &(ctx->key[0]);
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for (i = 0; i < ctx->keylen; i++, key++) {
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/* XOR the key byte with the appropriate pad filler byte */
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*ipad++ ^= *key;
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*opad++ ^= *key;
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}
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}
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void hb_HMAC_SHA1_StartMessage(HMAC_SHA1_CTX *ctx) {
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hb_SHA1_Init(&ctx->shactx);
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hb_SHA1_Update(&ctx->shactx, &(ctx->ipad[0]), HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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}
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void hb_HMAC_SHA1_UpdateMessage(HMAC_SHA1_CTX *ctx, const void *data, unsigned int datalen) {
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hb_SHA1_Update(&ctx->shactx, data, datalen);
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}
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void hb_HMAC_SHA1_EndMessage(unsigned char *out, HMAC_SHA1_CTX *ctx) {
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unsigned char buf[HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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SHA_CTX *c = &ctx->shactx;
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hb_SHA1_Final(&(buf[0]), c);
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hb_SHA1_Init(c);
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hb_SHA1_Update(c, &(ctx->opad[0]), HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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hb_SHA1_Update(c, buf, HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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hb_SHA1_Final(out, c);
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}
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void hb_HMAC_SHA1_Done(HMAC_SHA1_CTX *ctx) {
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/* Just to be safe, toast all context data */
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memset(&(ctx->ipad[0]), ZERO_BYTE, HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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memset(&(ctx->ipad[0]), ZERO_BYTE, HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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memset(&(ctx->key[0]), ZERO_BYTE, HMAC_SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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ctx->keylen = 0;
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ctx->hashkey = 0;
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}
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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#endif
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#endif
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